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NOTES 
Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit 
Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule IOh-5 
Of the vast amounts of statutory and quasi-statutory material 
governing the securities business, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's rule IOb-51 has potentially the greatest direct importance 
to the largest number of people. While several provisions in the 
government's regulatory scheme set more or less specific standards 
of conduct for securities issuers, broker-dealers, or corporate insiders, 
the anti-fraud provisions of rule I0b-5 apply to all persons directly 
or indirectly connected with any sale or purchase of securities trans-
acted through a facility of interstate commerce, the mails, or on a 
national exchange. In its three clauses, rule 1 0b-5 forbids any per-
son (I) to employ devices or schemes to defraud, (2) to misrepresent 
a material fact or to omit a material fact which causes any statement 
made to be misleading, or (3) to engage in any practice which would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. Rule I 0b-5 was pro-
mulgated by the SEC under the authority of section IO(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 19342 in order to enable the Commission 
to protect the market from fraud.8 The rule assumed its broad sig-
nificance, however, when the courts indicated a willingness to imply4 
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1964). Rule IOb-5 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, , 
"(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
"(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 
2. 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) (1958): 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any 
facility of any national exchange . • • 
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors." 
3. The SEC Release promulgating rule I0b-5 referred to it as a device to close 
"a loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission ••• .'' 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942. 
4. The meaning of the term implied remedy is set out in this language of the 
Supreme Court: "[D]isregard of the command of the statute [which does not specifically 
create a civil remedy] is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the 
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the 
damages from the party in default is implied .••• "Texas&: Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 
U.S. 33, 39 (1916). See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regu• 
latory_ Stnt'#tf!s, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285 (1963). 
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a private civil remedy in favor of both buyers and sellers injured 
by its violation. 15 
When a purchaser of securities brings suit, this judicial initia-
tive in implying a civil remedy poses a logical difficulty. Congress, 
in section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,6 expressly provided 
the stock purchaser with a cause of action against a seller who had 
misrepresented a material fact or omitted a material fact making his 
statements misleading. In other words, section 12(2) specifically 
affords civil relief for misconduct identical with that treated by 
clause (2) of rule IOb-5, but section 12(2) is available only to a 
securities p~rchaser. 7 Moreover, Congress placed significant statu-
tory restrictions on the buyer's use of section 12(2), most notably a 
short, one-year statute of limitations. 8 Given this detailed enuncia-
tion of a buyer's rights by Congress, reluctance by the judiciary to 
imply another private remedy for buyers under section lO(b) and 
rule 1 Ob-5, particularly when the alleged fraud is expressly within 
the ambit of section 12(2), is not surprising.9 
This hesitation might have developed into intransigence had it 
not been for the fact that Congress provided no cause of action for 
sellers comparable to that created for purchasers by section 12(2). 
5. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), which 
is the leading case. See also notes 10, 14 and 51 infra and accompanying text. 
6. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) 
(1958) provides: 
"Any person who ••• 
"(2) offers or sells a security ••• [except securities issued or guaranteed by the 
United States or a state or political subdivision], by the use of any means 
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce 
or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which 
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circum-
stances under which .they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not 
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden 
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person 
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity 
in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover .the consideration paid 
for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income re-
ceived thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no 
longer owns the security." (Emphasis added.) 
7. Section 12(2) would, of course, also allow the purchaser recovery on the basis of 
the practices proscribed by clauses (1) and (3) of rule lOb-5 when ,they involve mis• 
statements or omissions. 
8. Suit must be brought within one year after discovery of the untrue statement 
or omission and in no event more than three years after the date of sale. Securities 
Act of 1933, § 13, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958). There are other 
restrictions of less general impottance: State or municipal securities sales are exempted, 
the plaintiff is limited to an action for rescission (as opposed to damages) if he still 
owns the stock at the time of suit, -and suit may be brought only against ,the actual 
seller or one who is a "controlling person" under § 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 
48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 770 (1958). 
9. Several cases, decided in the late 1940's, denied buyers the advantages of the 
implied remedy. See, e.g., Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). -
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Thus, if a buyer's representations misled his seller, the latter could 
only sue under state law. Courts sought a way to equalize the situa-
tion and found the solution by implying civil relief under rule 
IOb-5 in favor of sellers.10 Doing so, however, gave the seller an 
apparent edge over the buyer because a seller's implied remedy was 
not encumbered by those restrictions surrounding a buyer's section 
12(2) action.11 Consequently, courts were faced with the alternative 
of either confining the buyer's federally created rights to those set 
out in section 12(2) with its restrictions, which is tantamount to 
treating a buyer as a second-class fraud victim in comparison with 
a seller, or else presuming that Congress did not intend section 
12(2) to provide the purchaser's exclusive relief under federal law 
and implying a less restricted remedy under rule 1 0b-5 in favor of 
both buyers and sellers.12 
The recent case of Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.18 is 
representative of the growing number of decisions that have elected 
the latter alternative, permitting a buyer's suit under rule IOb-5, 
including a suit for alleged misstatements and omissions under 
clause (2).14 Plaintiffs were a number of individual purchasers seek-
10. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), is the first 
case to permit a seller to sue under rule lOb-5. 
11. See note 8 supra. The controlling statute of limitations on the implied remedy 
under rule lOb-5 is ,that limitation period governing common-law suits of similar nature 
in the state in which the federal district court sits, and the rule lOb-5 suit is usually 
characterized as fraud. Invariably the state statute of limitations for fraud is longer 
than the one-year limitation period on a § 12(2) action. See Trussell v. United Under-
writers, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 775-76 (D. Colo. 1964); 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 
1771-78 (2d ed. 1961). 
It should be noted, however, that although § 12(2) contains restrictions that are 
not present in a suit under rule l0b-5, ~th § 12(2) and rule lOb-5 suits offer ad-
vantages over a common-law fraud action. First, omissions are actionable as long as 
they are of a material nature. This is not always the case at common law. See generally 
42 VA. L. R.Ev. 546-54 (1956). Second, special venue provisions and nationwide service 
of process are available. Securities Act of 1933, § 22, 48 Stat. 86, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77v (1958); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa 
(1958). 
12. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). A third possible alternative, 
permitting only the seller to sue under rule lOb-5 but reading the restrictions on a 
buyer's suit under § 12(2) into the seller's rule lOb-5 action, has never been adopted 
by any court and has been criticized as requiring "too substantial a judicial rewriting 
of the statutes.'' 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1790. 
13. 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964). 
14. The leading case implying a buyer's action is Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). The Fischman-Trussell line of cases has been criticized. 
See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1778-97. Nevertheless, since Fischman no court 
has seriously challenged the implication of a buyer's remedy from rule l0b-5. 
Several courts have also implied a private remedy from § 17(a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958). Dack v. Shanman, 
227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., supra at 787 n.2. Section 17(a) contains language 
virtually identical to that of rule l0b-5, except that § 17(a) governs only the conduct 
of sellers. The court in Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. 
Colo. 1964), held that since the express civil remedy of § 12(2) was created by Congress' 
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ing to recover from the seller-issuers. Some of the plaintiffs sought 
rescission of the transaction and recovery of their purchase price 
while others sought damages.111 Three counts in the complaint 
charged defendants with various misrepresentations and omissions 
in violation of rule lOb-5(2). Of these three, two counts failed to 
allege specifically "fraud," "knowledge of falsity," or "intent to de-
ceive" and were dismissed by the district court as insuffi.cient.16 
Dismissal was necessary, the court ruled, if it were to justify 
implying a remedy from rule lOb-5 when section 12(2) was already 
reworking the wording of § 17(a)(2), it would be going too far to circumvent the 
restrictions on § 12(2) by implying a remedy directly from § 17(a), apparently because 
§§ 12(2) and 17(a) were part of the same piece of legislation. Id. at 768-69. Those cases 
which do allow a buyer to sue under § 17(a) would treat it as interchangeable with 
§ I0b-5 and the plaintiff's rights under either as identical. See Dack v. Shanman, 
supra. The discussion in the text, although directed toward rule I0b-5, is, with one 
exception, note 28 infra, applicable also to § 17(a). 
15. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition of Motion for More Definite State-
ments, p. 4, Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., supra note 14. There is no 
indication of the measure of damages sought. Following the majority rule for 
computing damages in a fraud acti9n, plaintiff would be entitled to the difference 
between the actual value of the stock and the value which the stock would have 
had if the defendant's representations had been accurate. PROSSER, TORTS § 105, at 751 
(3d ed. 1964). Thus, if plaintiff purchased stock for $5,000 (its then present market 
value) on the basis of the defendant's statement that it would double in value within 
two years when in fact it retained its initial value, plaintiff could recover $5,000. Under 
the minority rule plaintiff would receive the difference between ·the amount he paid 
and the value of what he received. Id. at 750. Applying this measure of damages to 
the above situation, plaintiff would not be allowed any recovery. But cf. note 32 infra 
and accompanying text. 
16. The court summarized the two insufficient counts of the complaint: 
"The affirmative misrepresentations alleged in paragraph four of the first claim 
for relief are as follows: 
"a. That the stock sold by the defendants to the plaintiffs was worth eight 
dollars per share. 
"b. That the price of the stock would go up in value in the near future. 
"c. That the price of the stock would double in two years. 
"d. That the price of the stock would go up to twelve dollars per share in 
six months. 
"e. That the sellers would be able to resell in the event the purchaser wanted 
to trade. 
"f. That a market for the stock existed. 
"g. That the stock would be listed on a national securities exchange. 
"h. That the company was a sure thing. 
"i. That no one except one woman had ever asked for their money back, but if a 
person wanted it back, he could get it back without expense." 
"In paragraph four, then, the plaintiffs itemize the affirmative misstatements 
and half-truths allegedly promulgated by defendants. In paragraph five the plain-
tiffs shift ground. There they allege neither affirmative misstatement nor inten-
tional concealment; nor do they allege that sort of partial disclosure which would 
amount to the promulgation of half-truths. They allege, rather, substantially 
total nondisclosure •••• 
"The fourth claim • • • [incorporates the allegations of the first claim but] 
adds the further allegation that the defendants owed a legal duty to the plain-
tiffs to disclose full, complete and accurate information, that defendants negli-
gently failed to perform that duty, and that as a proximate result of this alleged 
breach of duty plaintiffs have been injured. As will later be seen, an allegation 
of mere negligence does not, in our view, state a claim arising under § I0(b) on 
which relief can be granted." 
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 760•62 (D. Colo. 1964). 
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available to provide specific relief for the type of allegations set out 
in plaintiffs' complaint.17 The language of section 12(2) allows the 
defendant-seller to defeat recovery if he proves he neither knew 
nor reasonably could have known the untruth or incompleteness 
of his statement.18 This language incorporates the element of com-
mon-law fraud or deceit known as scienter19 into a section 12(2) 
action, but as an affirmative defense. Therefore, reasoned the court, 
the existence of both the section 12(2) express remedy and the rule 
l0b-5 implied remedy could be reconciled by placing the burden of 
proving scienter on the plaintiff when the suit is brought under the 
latter provision. Thus, the two remedies would be distinguishable, 
and, therefore, in the court's view, compatible without being repeti-
tive because a prima fade action based on section 12(2) is subject 
to a stringent limitation period but is not circumscribed by the 
necessity of pleading fraud, while a suit under rule 1 0b-5 requires 
the plaintiff to plead and prove scienter as part of his prima fade 
case. 
While the adoption in Trussell of an implied remedy for buyers 
under rule lOb-5 to cover the same misconduct proscribed by section 
12(2) seems to be settled law today,20 two defects in the court's 
analysis are significant. The first lies in the fact that the opinion 
suggests that there was an underlying theme of congressional intent 
running throughout the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as amplified by rule l0b-5, which justifies 
implying relief from rule l0b-5 and indicates that the plaintiff must 
plead and prove scienter as part of his case if his cause of action 
depends upon this implied remedy. The court looked at the implied 
remedy, with plaintiff bearing the burden on the scienter issue, 
as fitting into a statutory scheme established by the express private 
17. An early case refused relief under rule IOb-5 on the ground that: 
"The settled rule of statutory construction is that, where there is a special 
statutory provision affording a remedy for particular specific cases and where 
there is also a general provision which is comprehensive enough to include what 
is embraced in -the former, the special provision will prevail over the general 
provision, and the latter will be held to apply only to such cases as are not within 
the former." 
Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
Cf. Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 76 (1936); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCOON 
§ 5204 (3d ed. 1943). 
18. See note 6 supra. 
19. The scienter element in a fraud or deceit action has traditionally been defined 
by the courts as an intent to mislead, derived from the classic dictum in Derry v. 
Peek, (1889] 14 App. Cas. 337. However, much confusion has attended this definition 
because Derry v. Peek fails to suggest what burden of proof ,the plaintiff must carry 
and postulates the alternative theories of recovery for a misrepresentation made 
"(2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whethCIJ it be true or false." 
Id. at 374. Neither of -these alternatives requires intent to deceive. The court in Trussell 
seems to adopt a standard similar to the last of these tests. See note 43 infra. See 
generally PROSSER, TORTS § 102, at 715-17 (3d ed. 1964). 
20. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. 
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remedies created by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. This is an unsatisfac-
tory rationale. The two acts were adopted primarily to establish 
standards for securities sellers and to provide for administrative 
maintenance of these standards.21 While each act does allow some 
private relief,22 it is limited to violations of only a few of the many 
regulatory provisions created by the legislation. Neither act evi-
dences a design on the part of Congress that a defrauded party to 
a stock transaction might recover only if scienter could be proved. 
Furthermore, rule 1 0b-5 was adopted eight years after the passage 
of the 1934 Act. Manifestly, the purpose of the rule was to regulate 
conduct, not to create private remedies for injured buyers or 
sellers.23 This regulatory evolution makes it highly improbable that 
Congress, or the SEC, intended an implied private rule IOb-5 suit 
and even more improbable that they intended the implication of 
a scienter requirement as an element of the implied cause of action. 
The second, and more serious, objection to the court's conclusion 
stems from the fact that it is not clear from the language of rule 
IOb-5 that scienter should be a necessary part of a plaintiff's case 
when he seeks relief under this provision. It can easily be argued 
that the words "defraud," "fraud," and "deceit," used in clauses 
(1) and (3) of rule I0b-5, carry their common-law connotations and, 
therefore, include the element of scienter.24 But the language of 
clause (2), the provision most similar to section 12(2), in no way 
suggests a requirement of scienter, defined either traditionally (de-
fendant actually knew the falsity of his representations) or in the 
more modern sense (defendant would or should have known the 
21. Cf. note 3 supra and note 29 infra. 
22. The following sections of the 1933 Act are the only ones that afford private 
relief: § 11 (misstatement in prospectus or registration statement); § 12(1) (offer or 
sale in violation of the basic prohibitions of § 5 of the act); § 12(2) (misrepresentation 
or omission of material facts in an offer or sale). Two additional private causes of 
action were created by the 1934 Act: § 9(e) (manipulation of the market price) and 
§ 18 (misstatement in document filed with SEC). Three of the above provisions are 
based on negligence, §§ 11, 12(1) and 12(2), while § 9 (e) requires proof of willful 
conduct and § 18 speaks in terms of strict liability. In addition, § 29(b) of the 1934 
Act permits rescission on the basis of a proven violation of any provision in the 
1934 Act, and § 16(b) allows a corporation (or stockholders suing on its behalf) to 
recover short-swing profits made by its officers or directors. The most apparent in· 
dication that the ,two acts established no neat scheme is that after their passage the 
seller still had no practical remedy by which he could recover on the basis of fraud. 
But cf. note 52 infra. 
23. See note 3 supra. The first successful private action maintained under rule IOb-5 
was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). To say that 
Congress intended a private rule IOb-5 suit as part of a regulatory scheme requiring 
proof of scienter when the buyer sues is to maintain that Congress, when it enacted 
the Securities Exchange Act in 1934, foresaw the language of a rule issued eight 
years later and also realized that the rule would become the basis for private relief 
twelve years later. 
24. But cf. cases cited notes 45 and 47 infra. 
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falsity of his representations had he used due care of investigation).25 
While the Trussell court recognized the interpretative problem 
in connection with the language of rule I0b-5(2), the court pro-
pounded two other reasons, in addition to the need for conforming 
with a congressional scheme of private relief, to buttress the 
conclusion that the burden of proving scienter should be re-
quired of the plaintiff in a IOb-5 suit irrespective of whether 
clause (2) literally so dictates. First, the court looked upon rule 
IOb-5 as chiefly regulatory in purpose and concluded that a private 
action should be implied only if the plaintiff proved the same type 
of misconduct the government must show in a criminal prosecution. 
Therefore, reasoned the court, since some quantum of mens rea is 
normally essential to convict in a criminal case, its civil equivalent, 
scienter, should be necessary in a private suit.26 The difficulty with 
this logic is that the objective of rule 1 0b-5 is to prevent fraudulent 
sales practices and, without any showing of intent to defraud, the 
SEC can, under the rule, issue a cease-and-desist order, suspend or 
revoke a broker-dealer's license, and seek an injunction to protect 
the public.27 It seems reasonable, therefore, that by analogy a 
private citizen should be able to prevent injury to himself without 
showing scienter. Second, the court suggested that since rule 1 0b-5 
was formulated under a statutory enabling provision which permits 
the SEC to promulgate regulations to curtail any "manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance," the rule would be outside the 
scope of the Commission's authority if some concept of scienter 
were not implied.28 This interpretation of the enabling provision 
is based solely on the court's reaction to the wording. The quoted 
language may well connote intentional or knowing conduct, but 
the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, from 
which it is taken, does not indicate such an implication was in-
tended.29 
Several cases appear to have taken the language of rule 1 0b-5 
clause (2) at face value and seem to show a willingness to let a buyer 
sue under this provision without pleading and proving scienter. One 
25. See note 43 infra and accompanying text. Professor Loss suggests that sdenter 
is not, strictly speaking, necessary to establish a violation of clause (2) but feels it 
should be implied for purposes of a private suit. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 11, at 
1442 n.45, 1766. 
26. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964). 
27. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); 3 Loss, op. dt. supra 
note 11, at 1442 n.45, 1449 and cases cited. 
28. Note 2 supra. This ultra vires argument would be inapplicable to § 17a, note 14 
supra, since § 17(a) was enacted directly by Congress, rather than by authority of an 
enabling provision. 
29. The most meaningful legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
is in S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Doc. No. 185, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1934) ; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1934). 
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opinion indicates that a plaintiff need only prove that a statement 
upon which he relied was, in fact, false or that an omission was mis-
leading.so However, the authorities cited to support this proposition 
discussed requirements for a suit brought under section 12(2) and not 
under rule IOb-5(2).s1 Moreover, plaintiff sought to recover his 
purchase price. This relief is of some significance because in a suit 
in equity many state courts grant rescission on the basis of any mis-
representation, regardless of whether scienter is shown.s2 The clear-
est example of a decision based on a literal reading of clause (2) is 
Dack v. Shanman.ss In denying a motion to dismiss the complaint 
for failure to state a claim in fraud or deceit the court held simply: 
"It is sufficient to allege that defendant made an untrue statement 
or omitted to state a material fact." However, this plaintiff also 
sought only rescission. Dicta in a third case,34 one in which sub-
stantial damages were sought, may also support the proposition 
that proof of scienter is not a requirement of the implied remedy. 
However, the context suggests the court may have meant only that 
a showing of scienter in the traditional sense of actual knowledge 
of falsity (as opposed to a negligent lack of knowledge) is not re-
quired.sis 
Of these two divergent views on the necessity of pleading and 
proving scienter as an element of plaintiff's prima fade case in a 
private suit under rule lOb-5(2), that adopted by Trussell is the 
better, but for more compelling reasons than were set out in the 
opinion. Rule l0b-5(2) must be construed in pari materia with three 
30. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. 
Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 
307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962). 
31. The authorities cited are Ouachita Indus., Inc. v. Willingham, 179 F. Supp. 493 
(W .D. Ark. 1959); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See Texas 
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., supra note 30, at 23. 
32. RES'rATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 476, comment b (1932). Although some of the 
plaintiffs in the principal case sought only rescission, even as to them the counts that 
did not incorporate an allegation of scienter were dismissed. The textual discussion 
is premised on the belief that no distinction based on the type of relief sought should 
be made in analyzing the scienter requirement. See note 39 infra. 
33. '2.27 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). This case arose under clause (2) of § 17(a) 
of the Securities Act of 1933. The relationship between § 17(a) and rule 10b·5 is 
discussed note 14 supra. 
34. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
35. Id. at 274. Defendant in this case presented the same argument the Trussell 
court accepted as valid, that the words "manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance" used in § IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require that the 
element of scienter be read into rule lOb-5(2) for purposes of a private suit. The 
Ellis court replied, however, that if Congress meant for the SEC to formulate rules 
directed at fraud only in the common-law sense it would probably have said so. See 
note 19 supra; cf. note 4!1 infra. 
Although other cases can be found which contain references to the scienter 
problem, the question was not in issue before the court and it is doubtful whether 
these comments are the products of thoughtful analysis. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler, 
208 F. Supp. 808, 82!1 (E.D. Wis. 1962), affd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 196!1). 
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private actions of somewhat similar character expressly created by 
Congress in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. Mention has already been made of section 12(2) of the 
1933 Act. In addition, section 11 of the 1933 Act86 and section 18 
of the 1934 Act37 provide a right of recovery for misrepresentations 
of a special kind-those appearing in a registration statement (in-
cluding the prospectus) or in any document filed with the SEC. The 
characteristic common to these three provisions is that in each the 
defendant may avoid liability if he can show due care and the 
reasonableness of his statements. 38 Each of these sections establishes 
a fault-oriented liability. The three provisions together form a 
pattern with which the implied remedy of rule I 0b-5 should be as 
consistent as possible. Thus, scienter should be an element of the 
rule I0b-5 cause of action to make it fault-oriented also. This con-
sistency is desirable not because of some logical scheme into which 
the rule IOb-5 suit must fit, but rather because the judiciary, in 
implying relief from rule IOb-5, should not render the expre~s but 
limited relief of sections 11, 12(2), and 18 surplusage.39 This would 
be the result if proof of scienter were not required in a I0b-5(2) 
suit since, in most instances, the plaintiff would attempt to ground 
his action under what would then constitute the strict liability of 
rule I0b-5. Moreover, there are few situations where relief is avail-
able to a plaintiff by the terms of sections 11, 12(2), or 18 where 
relief could not be as easily obtained under the private action 
created from rule I0b-5(2).40 In addition, of course, any use of rule 
IOb-5 as a substitute for section 11, 12(2), or 18 permits avoidance of 
the one-year limitation period governing these provisions.41 
The fact that rule I 0b-5 applies to any person connected with a 
securities transaction also has an important bearing on the question 
36. 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958). 
37. 48 Stat. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1958). 
38. Under § 11 the defendant may prove that he actually did investigate and 
still had reasonable grounds to believe the truth of his statement, and under § 18 
he may show he acted in "good faith." 
39. The standard should be the same whether the plaintiff seeks damages or 
rescission, even though innocent misrepresentation may suffice in a state common-law 
rescission case. See generally R.EsrATEMllNT, CoNTRAcrs § 476, comment b (1932). This 
conclusion is necessary if the implied remedy is not seriously to reduce the value of 
§ 12(2), because this section, although fault-oriented, limits relief to rescission if the 
complainant still owns the stock. The Trossell court adopted a single standard for 
all plaintiffs regardless of whether they sought damages or rescission. See note 32 supra. 
40. Cf. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Thiele v. 
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) • There are some situations where §§ 11 or 
18 migHt afford a more attractive avenue of recovery than rule l0b-5. For instance, 
under § 11, a corporation director may be strictly liable for misrepresentations in a 
prospectus if he merely consents ito his name being used in it. A plaintiff may prefer 
to rely on this provision rather than to attempt to show the defendant-director 
"made" the statement within the meaning of rule IOb-5(2). 
41. Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 84 Stat. 48, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §, 77m (1958); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18, 48 Stat. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1958). 
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of whether scienter should be an element of the plaintiff's case in 
a suit based on this provision. As indicated earlier, the common-law 
concept of scienter has been expanded by the courts to include more 
than actual knowledge of falsity.42 The term has often come to mean 
that, considering all the circumstances, and particularly that of 
accessibility to the facts, the defendant did not act as would the 
ordinarily prudent person to avoid misrepresentation, either express 
or by omission.48 Requiring the plaintiff in a rule lOb-5(2) suit to 
plead and prove scienter in this sense takes cognizance of the fact 
that one securities seller may have less ability than another to give 
his buyer an accurate picture regarding a particular purchase, and 
it apportions liability accordingly. The investor who sells without 
disclosing some matter of material significance, but which reasonable 
investigation under his circumstances could not have uncovered, 
should not be liable. This would not, however, be the result if the 
language of rule lOb-5(2) were strictly construed so as to preclude 
the necessity of proof of scienter as a part of the plaintiff's case. On 
the other hand, the law establishes a higher standard of care for 
persons closely associated with an issuing corporation and for those 
who might be termed professionals in the securities business, such 
as broker-dealers or investment counselors. These persons are viewed 
as near-fiduciaries in relation to their customers.44 Increasingly, the 
courts are holding that persons in the category of insiders or pro-
fessionals are under an affirmative duty to investigate a company 
before they make representations in an attempt to sell its shares.45 
42. See text accompanying note 25 supra. 
43. The problem of providing an exact definition of scienter is outside the scope 
of this note. It is apparent, however, that negligence in the sense in which it is 
used in the text often suffices. In United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 
1962), a criminal prosecution under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, the defendant argued 
that he had relied in good faith upon the information given him by others when 
he made certain representations concerning stock to prospective purchasers. The 
statements were in fact false. The court said: "This ignorance of facts is unavailing 
as a defense 'where the defendant, by the exercise of due diligence, could have become 
aware of his mistakes, especially where others may suffer a loss by his misstatements.' " 
299 F.2d at 629. See Keeton, Fraud-The Necessity for an Intent To Deceive, 5 
U.C.L.A.L. REY. 583 (1958). In light of these developments in the common law of 
fraud, the court in Trussell used overly limiting language when it indicated "reckless 
disregard" of the truth was the equivalent of scienter. 228 F. Supp. at 772. 
44. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186-92 (1963); 
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Charles Hughes&: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 
434, 436-38 (2d Cir. 1943) , cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). At times this higher 
standard of care appears to approximate strict liability. Cf. Cady, Roberts &: Co., 
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
45. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Herring v. Hendison, 218 F. Supp. 
419 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); SEC v. Chamberlain Associates, CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. 1f 91228 
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1963). An affirmative duty to investigate is imposed by statute upon 
those responsible for drawing up a registration statement or prospectus. Securities 
Act of 1933, § 11, 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958). The expanding con-
cept of the professional securities seller's fiduciary duty to his clients as well as to 
the market as a whole has been the subject of much commentary in recent months. 
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Because of the imposition of this higher standard, a plaintiff-buyer 
seeking to recover under rule I0b-5(2) from an insider or profes-
sional would find the scienter requirement, as defined above, a bar 
to recovery only where the defendant acted in the utmost good faith. 
Under this analysis, in a case such as Trussell where the defend-
ant is an issuer, it would appear that the plaintiff has set out all that 
is necessary to sustain his rule IOb-5(2) complaint against a motion 
to dismiss when he has alleged (I) that misstatements or omissions 
were made and (2) that the one making them was a person bound 
by this fiduciary obligation and the corresponding duty of investiga-
tion. Under the more modem concept of scienter, a plaintiff need 
not prove actual knowledge of falsity or intent to defraud; he need 
show only facts evidencing negligence, which will vary according 
to the circumstances of the particular defendant. In no case should 
a complaint be dismissed as insufficient to state a claim for relief 
merely because the plaintiff failed to include an incantatory word 
like "knowingly" or "fraudulently" if negligence is apparent from 
the facts alleged.46 When the defendant is an insider or professional, 
a complaint which sets out that fact and charges the defendant with 
untruths or half-truths should be sufficient with nothing more; the 
duty imposed upon a professional or insider47 is such that mis-
representations attributable to a member of one of these classes 
raises a presumption of a breach of that duty and establishes a 
prima fade right of recovery. The Trussell court was correct in 
holding that rule IOb-5(2) does not permit recovery without fault, 
and in concluding that it is the plaintiff's burden to prove the fault. 
The court failed, however, to take account of either the more liberal 
See Cohen &: Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards-The Importance of 
Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LA.w &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 691, 
702-14 (1964); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH, L. REv. 607 
(1964); Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 MICH. L. REv. 680, 
730-43 (1964). 
46. See notes 19 and 43 supra. Cf. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 
1944). Concerning the two counts found sufficient, the court stated: 
"The second claim incorporates both the substantive allegations made in the 
first claim [see note 16 supra] and the statement that the claim arises under 
§ IO(b) and Rule IOb-5, but adds an allegation that the misleading statements 
and half-truths promulgated by the defendants were promul~ted with full 
knowledge of their falsity, with full knowledge they would be relied upon by the 
plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs did rely thereon •to their detriment. The second 
claim ••• does state a claim arising under Rule IOb-5(2). The fifth claim in-
corporates both the substantive allegations made in the first claim and the state• 
ment that the claim arises under § l0(b) and Rule l0b-5, but adds an allegation 
that 'the acts of the plaintiffs [sic] complained of constituted a device, scheme 
or artifice to defraud plaintiffs and further operated as a fraud or deceit upon 
the plaintiffs in connection with purchase of the securities in question.' With 
the addition of this allegation the fifth claim does state a claim arising under 
Rule IOb-5(1) and (3).'' 
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 762-63 (D. Colo. 1964). 
The claims found sufficient are set out in note 16 supra. Claim three is not material 
to this discussion. . 
47. See Heft, Kahn &: Infante, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, 
Feb. 11, 1963; Cady, Roberts 8: Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); cases cited note 45 supra. 
test48 of what constitutes fault in a fraud action or of the higher
standards of fair-dealing which must be met by those in the defend-
ants' position. Consequently, the court did not recognize the prima
facie pleading of fault in the facts alleged in the complaint before
it, and in dismissing two counts as insufficient, it misapplied its
own rule.
49
While this discussion has dealt primarily with buyers' suits
under clause (2) of rule lOb-5 because it has been in cases of this
kind that the question of proof of scienter has been in sharpest
focus, if proof of fault, albeit varying in quantity according to the
defendant's status, is an element of plaintiff's prima facie case in a
rule lOb-5(2) action, it should similarly be an element of claims
based upon clauses (1) and (3), which are expressly couched in terms
of "fraud" and "deceit." 50 Likewise, a seller should also have the same
burden of pleading and proof heretofore suggested for buyers. 51
While it is true that there are no express statutory provisions with
which a seller's remedy need be reconciled comparable to those
created for buyers by sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act,5 2 the
entire evolution of private recovery under rule lOb-5 was motivated
by the courts' desire to establish equality of treatment for both
buyers and sellers.58
48. See note 16 supra. Cf. note 43 supra and accompanying text.
49. The correct result was thus probably reached in the three cases discussed
earlier in the text, supra notes 30, 33 and 34 and accompanying text, because in each
case the defendant was apparently a professional in the securities business. They were
critiized, however, because the courts seemingly imposed a strict liability on the
defendants.
50. See note I supra.
51. The most frequently cited case involving a seller's suit under rule lOb-5
emphasized the intentional character of defendant's omissions. Speed v. Transamerica,
88 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). There are apparently no seller's-suit cases holding
that scienter is unnecessary for a rule 10b-5 action.
52. Section 18 of the 1934 Act, previously considered in conjunction with §§ 11
and 12(2), text accompanying notes 36-41 supra, is available to a seller as well as a
buyer. However, § 18 requires proof of reliance by plaintiff and, probably because of
the difficulty of this proof, use of § 18 has been negligible. See 3 Loss, Op. cit supra
note 11, at 1753. Therefore, if a seller were allowed to sue under rule lob-5 without
a showing of fault on the part of defendant he would certainly rely on this provision
in preference to § 18.
53. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
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